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Abstract 
Both teacher quality and teacher salaries are endogenously correlated in the teacher labor market. Therefore, due to 
endogeneity, we develop three econometric simultaneous-equation models to examine the link between teacher quality 
and teacher salaries. A total of 500 school districts in the state of Pennsylvania during the school years 1999-2000 to 
2001-2002 are selected for a case study. Results reveal a positive and significant relationship between these two.
I would like to thank discussants at the Southern Economic Association Conference in Charleston and anonymous referees for very helpful 
discussion and advice. 
Citation: Tin-chun Lin, (2009) ''Teacher quality and teacher salaries: the case of Pennsylvania'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29 no.3 pp. 2136-
2144. 




Teacher quality is tied to salary, with salary levels affecting a school district’s probability of 
hiring a highly qualified teacher. On the other hand, a highly qualified teacher is more likely to 
receive higher pay in the market. In other words, teacher salary is also tied to quality,  with 
quality levels affecting a school authority’s decision to pay a high salary. For that reason, both 
teacher quality and teacher salaries may be endogenously correlated. Although portions of the 
economics and education literatures are devoted to investigations of the issue (e.g., Figlio, 1997 
and 2002; Ballou and Podgursky, 1997; Darling-Hammond, 2000; Ascher and Fruchter, 2001; 
Hess, 2004; and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 2004), no previous studies have examined the 
endogenous relationship between teacher quality and teacher salaries. Therefore, we attempt to 
develop three econometric simultaneous-equation  models to address the link between teacher 
quality and teacher salaries.
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we  present  three  econometric  simultaneous-
equation models and describe data measurement. Second, we report the empirical results. Third, 
an interesting question is raised for discussion.  Conclusion may be found in the final section.
II. Econometric Models and Data Measurement
A qualified education product is determined by both the school authority and teachers jointly. 
Therefore,  due  to  endogeneity,  teacher  quality  and  teacher  salaries  are  jointly  determined 
simultaneously. Hence, a simple simultaneous-equation model can be specified as follows:
Teacher Quality = f (Teacher salaries, School quality, Ethnicity, Student dropout rate), 
and
Teacher Salaries = f (Teacher quality, Community quality, Student-teacher ratio, 
Male-female teacher ratio, Urbanization).
A total of 500 school districts in the state of Pennsylvania for 3 school years (1999–2000, 2000–
2001, and 2001–2002) were selected for a case study. The data used in this study are district-
level and can be found at the Pennsylvania Department of Education website and the National 
Center for Education Statistics website. Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for all 
variables used in the study.
Two important factors mainly determine a teacher’s quality (Q): educational level (E) and
years of teaching experiences (Y). Therefore, it is measured as the average education level of 
full-time teachers multiplied by average total years of teaching (i.e., Q = E x Y) (see Note 1). The 
proxy for public school quality is instructional expenditures per pupil. It should be noted that the 
instructional expenditures do not include teacher salaries. In addition, ethnicity may have an 
impact  on  teacher  quality,  because  different  ethnic  groups  reflect  different  socio-economic 
characteristics.  In  this  study,  we  focus  on  three  minority  ethnic  groups.  They  are:  Asian, 
Hispanic/American-Indian,  and  African-American.  We  use  the  proportion  of  each  ethnic 
enrollment as a proxy. The quality of community is measured by median household income. 
Urbanization is measured according to codes (see Note 2). Student dropout rate is measured as 
total students who dropout from schools divided by total student enrollments. Student-teacher 
ratio  is  measured as total student  enrollments divided by total  full-time teachers  in  a school
district. Male-female teacher ratio is measured as total full-time male teachers divided by total 
full-time female teachers.2
Based upon the simple simultaneous-equation model, we can develop the following three 
regression  functions:  (1)  the  linear  function;  (2)  the  Cobb-Douglas  function;  and  (3)  the
transcendental function. These three econometric models can be expressed as follows.
Model 1:
ATQ a a ATS a INS a PBE a PAE a PHE a PSD it it it it it it it t         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1      (1.1)
and
ATS b b ATQ b MHI b INS b STR b MFR bURB it it it it it it it t         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2           (1.2)
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1 2 3 4 5 6                       (2.2)
Taking natural logarithms of both sides of Equations (2.1) and (2.2), teacher quality (ATQ) and 
teacher salaries (ATS) functions become linear. Hence, the econometric models can be created as 
follows.
log log log log log log ATQ c c ATS c INS c PBE c PAE c PHE it it it it it it       0 1 2 3 4 5
  c PSDit t 6 3 log  ,                                                                                (2.3) 
and
log log log log log log ATS d d ATQ d MHI d INS d STR d MFR it it it it it it       0 1 2 3 4 5
  d URBit t 6 4 log  ,                                                                                (2.4)
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Taking natural logarithms of both sides of Equations (3.1) and (3.2), teacher quality (ATQ) and 
teacher salaries (ATS) functions become linear. Thus, the econometric models can be developed
as follows.
log log log ATQ f f ATS f INS f PBE f PAE f PHE it it it it it it       0 1 2 3 4 5
  f PSDit t 6 5  ,                                                                                    (3.3)
and
log log log log ATS g g ATQ g MHI g INS g STR g MFR it it it it it it       0 1 2 3 4 5
  g URBit t 6 6  ,                                                                                     (3.4)
where i = 1, 2, 3,…, 500; t = 1999 – 2000, 2000 – 2001, 2001 – 2002; logC c 0 0  ; logD d 0 0  ; 
logF f 0 0  ;  logG g 0 0  ; ATQ = average teacher quality; ATS = average teacher salaries; INS = 
instructional expenditures per pupil; PBE = proportion of African-American enrollments; PAE = 
proportion of Asian enrollments; PHE = proportion of Hispanic/American Indian enrollments; 
PSD = public school student dropout rates; MHI = median household income; STR = student-
teacher ratio; MFR = male-female teacher ratio; URB = urbanization; and    1 6 t t ,..., = stochastic 
disturbance (with a mean 0 and a variance
2).
III. Empirical Results3
To correct for simultaneous equations bias, the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) procedure 
is used to obtain unique estimates that are consistent and asymptotically efficient. The results 
from estimations of equations (1.1), (1.2), (2.3), (2.4), (3.3), and (3.4) are presented in Table 2. 
First, let’s take a look at the estimations of teacher quality. As Table 2 shows, teacher salaries
(ATS) exert a positive and significant effect at the 1% level on teacher quality (ATQ) in all three 
models,  meaning  that  higher  teacher  salaries  will  attract  more highly  qualified  teachers.  In 
addition, the elasticity of teacher quality with respect to wages is estimated by 1.247 in Model 2 
and 1.093 in Model 3. The elasticity is elastic, implying that a 1% increase in wages is estimated 
to  lead  to  an  increase  in  teacher  quality  by  1.247%  in  Model  2  and  1.093%  in  Model  3.
Moreover, instructional expenditures per pupil also provide a positive and significant effect at 
the 1% level on teacher quality in all three models, which implies that a good quality school 
provides better facilities and environments for teaching and thus attracts more highly qualified 
teachers  and  improves  a  teacher’s  teaching  quality.  However,  minority  student  enrollments 
(Hispanic/American Indian, African-American, and Asian) exert a negative and significant effect 
on teacher quality in all three models at the 1% level, implying that the higher the minority 
student enrollments the less qualified the teachers. A possible explanation for the result is that 
racial distribution positively reflects income distribution and in turn affects community quality. 
A higher community quality is more likely to attract more highly qualified teachers due to higher 
pay. Finally, public school student dropout rates provide a positive and significant effect at the 
5% or 10% level on teacher quality in all three models, meaning that the greater the number of 
low-performing  and  marginal  students  withdrawing  from  schools,  the  greater the  number  of
highly qualified teachers remaining at the school.  
Turning now to the estimations of teacher salaries, as Table 2 shows, teacher quality exerts a 
positive and significant effect on teacher salaries at the 1% level, which implies that teacher 
salary is also tied to quality, with quality levels affecting a school authority’s decision to pay a 
high salary. That is, a highly qualified teacher would be more likely to get higher pay. Moreover, 
the elasticity of teacher salaries with respect to teacher quality is estimated by 0.87515 in Model 
2 and 0.93996 in Model 3. The elasticity is inelastic, meaning that a 1% increase in teacher 
quality is estimated to lead to increase in teacher salaries by 0.87515% in Model 2 and 0.93996% 
in Model 3. In addition, median household income exerts a positive and significant effect on 
teacher salaries, meaning that a higher-quality community collects more taxes that will then be 
used to pay higher salaries to teachers. In other words, the higher the quality of the community 
(identified  by  median  household  income),  the  better  the  teacher  pay  in  the  community. 
Moreover, instructional expenditure per pupil, student-teacher ratio, and urbanization all exert a 
positive  and  significant  effect  at  the  1%  level  on  teacher  salaries  in  all  three  models. 
Nevertheless, male-female teacher ratio does not provide a significant effect at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level. The above results imply the following facts: (1) the better the quality of the school 
(identified by instructional expenditure per pupil), the better able it is to pay higher salaries to 
teachers; (2) the higher the student-teacher ratio, the more likely  it is that each teacher may
receive more pay; (3) the more urbanized the school district, the higher the teacher salaries; and 
(4)  no  strong  evidence  shows  that  gender  discrimination  exists  in the  teacher  labor  market, 
because male-female teacher ratio does not exert a significant effect on teacher salaries.  
IV. Discussion4
Since teacher quality and teacher salaries are endogenously correlated, this implies that the 
level of salaries positively reflects the level of quality. For that reason, an interesting question 
may be raised for discussion: do school authorities want to offer higher salaries to hire highly 
qualified  teachers? In discussing this question, we attempt to apply a simple supply-demand 
framework to the teacher labor market. 
Suppose that there are two teachers, A and B. Teacher A holds a master degree in education 
and has been teaching at a high school for ten years; while Teacher B holds a bachelor degree in 
education and has been teaching at a high school for one year. According to our measure of 
teacher  quality,  obviously teacher  A’s  quality  is  higher  than  teacher  B’s  quality. Therefore, 
teacher A will have a higher marginal cost than teacher B. That is, teacher A’s labor is more 
expensive than teacher B’s labor. For that reason, as shown in Figure 1, teacher A’s supply curve 
for labor is higher than teacher B’s supply curve for labor. Given  L
*units of labor (see Figure 1), 
Teacher A is supposed to get paid at W2 per unit of labor while teacher B is supposed to get paid 
at W 1 per unit of labor.       
However, as shown in Figure 2, given salary schedule D (i.e., the demand curve for the 
school authority), the school authority will only want to pay W3 per unit of labor to teacher A
(note:W W W 1 3 2   ). According to salary schedule D, teacher A will only want to supply L’ units 
of labor rather than L* units of labor; while teacher B will supply L* unites of labor although
he/she may get lower pay at W 1 per unit of labor (note: L’ < L*). If the school authority requires 
L* units of labor for each teacher, the school authority will have two options: (1) to hire teacher 
A, the school authority has to raise the salary schedule from D to D’ and pay W2 per unit of labor
to teacher A; or (2) they just hire teacher B and pay W 1 per unit of labor to teacher B and save 
some budgetary funds although teacher quality may be lower.  
How does the school authority make a choice? It depends on the primary goal and budget. 
Given the budget, if the primary goal is to improve student achievement, the authority may adopt 
the first option. But the question is whether or not teacher education/experience has a positive 
and significant impact on student achievement. In 2003, Hanushek showed that a majority of the 
studies through 1994 in the United States found no statistically significant link between teacher 
education/experience and student outcomes. However, Lin (2008) had a different result. He used 
Pennsylvania  as  a  case  study  and  found  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  relationship 
between teacher education/experience and student performance.
Therefore,  school  authorities’  decision  whether  to  offer  higher  salaries  to  hire  highly 
qualified  teachers  depends  on  their primary  goals,  and  whether  they  believe  that  teacher 
education/experience exerts a positive and significant impact on student achievement. In other 
words,  different primary  goals  and  beliefs may  lead  to  different  education  outcomes  and 
employment policies in the teacher labor market.           
V. Conclusion
In this paper, both teacher quality and teacher salaries are endogenously correlated in the 
market. Therefore, due to endogeneity, three econometric simultaneous-equation models were
created to examine the linkage between teacher quality and teacher salary. Results revealed a 
significant and positive  relationship between these two, implying  that salary  level positively 
reflects quality level. 5
Furthermore, a simple supply-demand framework in the teacher labor market was applied to 
discuss an  interesting question – whether or not school authorities will want  to offer higher 
salaries  to  hire  highly  qualified  teachers.  The  answer  would  depend  on  school  authorities’ 
primary goals and beliefs regarding whether teacher education/experience exerts a positive and 
significant impact on student achievement. 
Notes
1. The level of education is measured via codes. These codes are: 1 = less than high school graduate; 2 = high 
school graduates; 3 = less than bachelor’s degree; 4 = bachelor’s degree; 5 = master’s degree; and 6 = doctor’s 
degree (see Public School Professional Personnel, Pennsylvania Department of Education).
2. These codes are: 1 = school district located in Rural, inside Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA); 2 = school 
district located in Rural, outside CBSA; 3 = school district located in Small Town; 4 = school district located in 
Large Town; 5 = school district located in Urban Fringe of a Mid-size City; 6 = school district located in Urban 
Fringe of a Large City; 7 = school district located in Mid-size City; and 8 = school district located in Large 
City. (Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education [www.pde.state.pa.us]).
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Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables
Variables Mean Standard Deviation
Median household income 29181.2 8883.41
Log value of median household income 10.2404 0.279522
Average educational level 4.42367 0.142056
Log value of average education level 1.48646 0.0319795
Average years of teaching experience 16.6581 2.25981
Log value of average years of teaching experience 2.80353 0.137943
Average teacher salaries 47755.9 6018.73
Log value of average teacher salaries 10.7664 0.120978
Instructional expenditures per student 4961.37 746.562
Log value of instructional expenditures per student 8.49912 0.140950
Proportion of low income families 0.265127 0.164497
Proportion of Asian student enrollments 0.0111550 0.0161444
Proportion of Hispanic and American Indian student 
enrollments
0.0185550 0.0540464
Proportion of African-American student enrollments 0.0552983 0.127524
City size (urbanization) 4.056 1.77622
Student-teacher ratio 15.9049 1.91993
Male-female teacher ratio 0.482995 0.111982
Public school dropout rate 0.017054 0.01140237








log ATQ log ATS
Model 3: 2SLS
Explained Variables:






















































































2 0.352 0.818 0.401 0.784 0.349 0.793
R
2 0.350 0.817 0.399 0.783 0.346 0.792
F-Statistics 135.35 1115.15 153.07 904.47 133.47 950.87
Sample Size 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
 (t-value) *** Denotes statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.01 level; ** denotes statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.05 
level; * denotes statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.10 level.8
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Figure 1: Supply Curves for Teacher A and Teacher B
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Figure 2: Teacher Labor Market for Teacher A and Teacher B
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